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Abstract 
What is the appropriate inflation target for a currency union, when conducting monetary 
policy: core inflation or headline inflation? We answer the question in a two-country 
New Keynesian model with an energy sector. We derive the welfare loss function and 
find that optimal monetary policy should target output gaps, the terms of trade gap, the 
Prouder Price Index inflation rates, and the real marginal cost gaps. We use the welfare 
loss function to evaluate two alternative Taylor-type monetary policy rules. We find that 
the choice of preferred policy rule depends on the shocks. Specifically, when 
productivity shocks hit the economy, the policymaker should follow the headline 
inflation Taylor rule, while the core inflation Taylor rule should be followed when a 
negative energy endowment shock hits the economy. 
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 1. Introduction 
Recently, substantial volatility in energy prices has motivated debate about how 
monetary policymakers should conduct monetary policy. As is well known, 
considerable energy price hikes produce a stark distinction between headline and core 
inflation rates.  Headline inflation measurement is similar to that from the 
conventional consumer price index (CPI), while core inflation removes some of the 
CPI’s most volatile components, such as energy and food prices.  Which inflation rate 
is the appropriate target for monetary policy? Opinions among researchers and 
policymakers are divided on this subject.  Energy price hikes can produce a 
phenomenon resembling bifurcation in New Keynesian model dynamics, thereby 
altering the optimal policy regime.  On the general subject of bifurcation of New 
Keynesian models, see Barnett and Duzhak (2010).1 
Researchers have long considered core inflation to be the most appropriate measure 
of inflation for targeting by monetary policymakers. In a New Keynesian monetary 
model, Aoki (2001) demonstrates that targeting sticky-price inflation can achieve 
stabilization of relative price around its efficient value, as is one of the appropriate goals 
of monetary policy.  Aoki (2001) thereby provides a rationale for targeting the core 
inflation rate. Aoki’s (2001) conclusion is confirmed by Mankiw and Reis (2003). In a 
multi-sector model, they show that the monetary policymaker should put more weight 
on sectors that have sluggish price adjustment. Bodenstein et al. (2008) also find that, 
for both the operational conduct of monetary policymakers and their communication 
strategies, monetary policy responding to a forecast of core inflation performs best to 
stabilize the economy. By contrast, Anand et al. (2015) find that, for developing 
countries with incomplete financial markets, targeting the core inflation rate cannot 
stabilize output and improve welfare. In this circumstance, targeting the headline 
inflation rate will improve welfare. In practice, when framing the objectives and 
                                                        
1 Strictly speaking, Barnett and Duzhak (2010) explore the literal concept of bifurcation, by which the parameters 
of a New Keynesian model move, while crossing a Hopf or period-doubling bifurcation boundary.  Changes in 
variables do not cause bifurcations in the formal mathematical sense. 
conducting monetary policy, both the Bank of England and the European Central Bank 
target the headline inflation rate. However, other central banks, including the U.S. 
Federal Reserve, pay more attention to the core inflation rate, at least in describing their 
operational decisions. 
Since the European Central Bank targets the headline inflation rate, one question 
naturally arises: is it always an optimal choice for European Central Bank to target the 
headline inflation rate? Relevant multilateral aggregation theory for aggregation within 
and over currency unions can be found in Barnett (2007).2 Benigno (2004) aims at 
examining how to conduct optimal monetary policy for a two-country currency union.  
He finds that, when two countries have the same degree of price stickiness, it is optimal 
for the monetary policymaker to target a weighted average of the inflation rates in the 
union, with the weights being equal to the sizes of the countries. Though he makes 
substantial progress towards answering the question facing the European Central Bank, 
he makes no distinction between the core inflation rate and the headline inflation rate. 
Thus, the conclusion obtained in Benigno (2004) cannot act as a clear rationale to guide 
the monetary policy choice facing the European Central Bank. 
To fill the gap, building on Benigno (2004), we distinguish the core inflation rate 
from the headline inflation rate by introducing a flexible-price energy good into 
consumption and production.  We then investigate which inflation rate performs better 
from the perspective of welfare loss. We find that the "divine coincidence" breaks down. 
When the monetary policymaker chooses to target zero inflation rate for the whole 
union, it becomes impossible to close output gaps simultaneously.  The reason is that 
the terms of trade cannot adjust efficiently in response to asymmetric shocks, . 
Following the literature, we derive the welfare loss function of the monetary 
policymaker in the union and find that the welfare loss function depends upon the 
inflation rates of the non-energy consumption goods in both countries, the union-wide 
output gap, the terms of trade gap, and the real marginal cost gaps. It is well known that 
                                                        
2 Barnett (2007) proved that in a currency union, there are two cost of living indexes, needed for different 
purposes, as the “headline” price aggregate.  In that paper, see Definition 3, Lemma 3, and the discussion 
following Lemma 3.  In this paper, our measurement of headline inflation is described in section 4.2 below. 
the output gap and the inflation rates of the sticky-price sectors are the sources of 
distortion in a standard New Keynesian monetary model. As mentioned previously, in 
a two-country currency union model, following asymmetric shocks, the terms of trade 
cannot adjust efficiently and thus cause the welfare loss. In our model, when energy-
good price is flexible, the price stickiness not only prevents energy good from being 
allocated efficiently between households and firms but also between firms in different 
countries. Accordingly, the real marginal cost gaps result in welfare loss. 
We use the welfare loss function to evaluate two different Taylor-type monetary 
policy rules to answer the following question. In a currency union, what is the 
appropriate target for the monetary policymaker, the core inflation rate or the headline 
inflation rate? In one case, the interest rate is used to target the headline inflation rate. 
We call that policy the headline inflation Taylor rule (HIT). In the other case, the interest 
rate is used to target the core inflation rate.  We call that policy the core inflation Taylor 
rule (CIT). 
We find that which monetary policy rule performs best depends on the source of the 
shocks. Specifically, when the whole union is buffeted by productivity shocks, use of 
the CIT, rather than the HIT, causes the shocks to be amplified, producing increased 
welfare loss. In that circumstance, the European Central Bank’s approach makes the 
correct choice, improving union-wide welfare, by targeting headline inflation. However, 
when a negative energy endowment shock hits the economy, the HIT amplifies the 
shock, leading to greater welfare loss. In that case, the European Central Bank could 
obtain welfare gain by following the CIT. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 
derives the steady state, the flexible-price equilibrium, and the sticky-price equilibrium. 
Section 4 performs the monetary policy analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
The currency union consists of two countries indexed by H and F, respectively. The 
total measure of population in the union is normalized to unity. The home country, H, 
is inhabited by a continuum of households on the interval [0, γ], and the foreign country, 
F, is populated by the rest of the households on the interval [γ,1]. There is no labor 
mobility across countries. Unlike Benigno (2004), we follow Gail and Monacelli (2008) 
and Ferrero (2009), and assume that both the domestic and international financial 
markets are complete. Though there exists a separate fiscal authority for each country, 
a common central bank conducts the monetary policy for the entire union. The non-
energy consumption goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms, each 
using domestic labor and energy to produce a differentiated product. The consumption 
basket of a home representative household includes not only domestic and imported 
consumption goods but also energy. Thus, there is a distinction between headline and 
core inflation. 
2.1.Households 
The representative household (0,1)j∈  in country { , }k H F∈   maximizes the 
following utility function 
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where (0,1)β ∈  is the discount factor, jtC  is consumption, and jtL  is labor supplied 
by household j  . When (0, )j∈ γ  , it follows that k H=  , while when ( ,1)j∈ γ  , it 
follows that k F= . The consumption jtC  is a composite of non-energy consumption 
goods jntC  and energy goods jetC , such that  
 
1
1
( ) ( )
(1 )
j j
j nt et
t
C CC
α α
α αα α
−
−= −
 . (2) 
Non-energy consumption goods, jntC  ,  are a composite of domestic and imported 
goods, such that 
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Accordingly ,j HntC and ,j FntC are CES aggregates across the continuum of differentiated 
non-energy consumption goods produced in the home and foreign country, respectively. 
Specifically, 
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where 1ε >  is the elasticity of substitution across non-energy consumption goods 
produced within a country. 
Solving the representative household j's expenditure-minimization problem gives 
rise to 
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where 1t et ntP P Pα α−=  is the CPI, etP  is the energy price, 1( ) ( )H Fnt nt ntP P Pγ γ−=  is the price 
index for non-energy consumption goods, 
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The representative household (0,1)j∈   maximizes equation (1) subject to the 
following budget constraint 
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in which ( )j tD s   is the nominal payoffs on state-contingent claims for state ts  , 
purchased by household j  at time t  , 1( )t tZ s s+  is the state ts  price of a claim that 
yields one unit of currency in state 1ts + , ktW  is the nominal wage, ktT  denotes lump-
sum taxes, and ktΓ denotes aggregate profits accruing from ownership of home firms. 
The first-order condition for labor supply is given by 
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Equation (9) implies that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
consumption is equal to the real wage. 
The intertemporal consumption choice is described by 
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=  is the normalized price of the state contingent claim. 
Equation (10) implies that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is equal to the 
price of the state contingent claim. Taking expectations on both sides of equation (10), 
we obtain the stochastic Euler equation: 
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where 11[ ( | )]t t t tR E Z s s
−
+=  is the gross nominal return on a riskless one-period bond. 
2.2 Firms 
The total measure of firms is unity worldwide, where the firms in the interval (0, )γ
are located in the home country, while the rest of the firms are located in the foreign 
country. The representative firm (0,1)i∈   produces a differentiated non-energy 
consumption good with the following technology 
 1 ( ) ( ) ( )k k k knt t t tY i A L i O i
δ δ−= ,  (12) 
in which ktA is a productivity shock common to all firms in each country, while ( )
k
tL i
and ( )ktO i are labor and energy employed, respectively. When (0, )i∈ γ , it follows that 
k H= , while when ( ,1)i∈ γ , it follows that k F= . The labor markets are segmented, 
with wage determined competitively in each country. Non-energy consumption goods 
are traded freely worldwide. 
Letting k kt ta ln A= , we assume that the productivity shock evolves according to the 
AR(1) process 
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t t ta aρ ε−= + ,  (13) 
where (0,1)kρ ∈ , 2 (0, )kt kNε σ . 
Solving firm i  's cost-minimization problem, we can obtain its unit cost function: 
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respectively, by 
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Firms set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo (1983). In each period, 
independently of previous adjustments, the representative firm (0,1)i∈  can adjust its 
price with a probability 1 kθ− . In the event of a price adjustment in period t, it chooses 
*( )kntP i  to maximize 
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subject to the demand schedule given by 
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in which , ( / ) ( / )
t
t t tC C P P
τ σ
ττ τβ
− −Λ =   is the stochastic discount factor, kτ   is the 
common subsidy given to firms in country k , |kn tMC τ  and ( )kn tY iτ  represent the unit 
cost and output of firm (0,1)i∈ in periodτ .  That firm last reset its price in period t , 
and 
1
0
W jC C djτ τ= ∫  is aggregate consumption in the union. The optimally adjusted price 
for firm (0,1)i∈  is given by 
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in which 
( 1)(1 )k
ε
ε τ− +
 is markup adjusted by subsidy. 
3. Equilibrium 
Define home and foreign aggregate output as 
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by equations (16) and (17), we know that ( ) 11H Wnt nt et tY S Cγ αγ α − −= − Ψ   and
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Aggregate labor demands in both countries are given, respectively, by 
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 are home and foreign price 
dispersions.  Those dispersions are of second order. 
Following Bodenstein et al. (2008, 2013) and Devereux et al. (2010), we assume that, 
in each period, the world is endowed with an exogenous energy endowment stO . The 
oil price etP  varies endogenously to clear the world oil market, where 
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in which 
1 1
0 0
, ( ) , and ( )W j H H F Fet et t t t tC C dj O O i di O O i di= = =∫ ∫ ∫
γ
γ
 . Exogenous energy 
endowment stO  is governed by the following stochastic process 
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3.1. The steady state 
The steady state follows, when 1s H Ft t tO A A= = = . The monopoly power owned by 
firms implies that a steady-state markup distortion emerges. To eliminate the distortion 
and restore efficiency, we assume that the fiscal authority in each country subsidizes 
the production with a subsidy, raised in a lump-sum fashion from the households. 
To eliminate the linear terms, when taking a second-order approximation to the joint 
utility function of the whole union, we need several crucial steady-state ratios. The ratio 
of home to foreign employment is 
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3.2. The flexible-price equilibrium 
To obtain an efficient flexible-price equilibrium, we assume that the markup 
distortions can be eliminated by government subsidies. In addition, following 
Bodenstein et al. (2008), we assume that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is unity, 
with the utility function of consumption that is logarithmic. In the following, we use a 
lower-case variable with an upper bar to represent the deviation of the log of the 
corresponding flexible-price variable from its steady-state value. 
Home output can be expressed as 
 ( )1H s Hnt nt nt t ty s c o aγ δ= − + = + .  (23) 
  The foreign counterpart of equation (23) is 
 F s Fnt nt nt t ty s c o aγ δ= − + = + .  (24) 
  The terms of trade are the difference between home and foreign productivity shocks, 
given by 
 H F H Fnt nt nt t ts y y a a= − = − .  (25) 
Since domestic financial markets are complete, home households consume the same 
amount of goods. Furthermore, complete international financial markets, together with 
the assumption that there is no home bias in consumption, imply that the consumption 
level of the home representative household is identical to that of the foreign counterpart, 
 ( ) [ ]1 , for any 0,1j s H Ft o t H t H tc o a a j= Θ + Θ + − Θ ∈γ γ ,  (26) 
where , 1o Hα δ δα αΘ = + − Θ = − . 
  The relative price of non-energy consumption goods in terms of energy goods is 
 ( )(1 ) 1s H Fet t t to a aψ δ γ γ= − − − − .  (27) 
Intuitively, etψ  increases with the endowment of energy goods and decreases with 
positive productivity shocks. 
3.3. The sticky-price equilibrium 
In this section, we express the sticky-price equilibrium as a log-linear approximation 
around the steady state. A lower-case variable refers to the log deviation of the 
corresponding upper-case variable from its steady state value. 
  Log-linearization of equation (9) and its foreign counterpart yields 
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domestic consumption-goods wages, respectively. Other things being equal, when the 
relative price of non-energy consumption goods in terms of energy goods rises, both 
home and foreign domestic consumption goods wages decrease. As a comparison, when 
the terms of trade in the home country deteriorate, home consumption goods are 
cheaper than foreign consumption goods. Thus, home domestic consumption goods 
wage goes up, while foreign domestic consumption goods wage is depressed. 
From the non-energy consumption goods production function in both countries, we 
have 
 [ (1 ) ]H H Hnt t t Ht nt ety a l sδ η γ ψ= + + − − +   (30) 
 [ ]F F Fnt t t Ft nt ety a l sδ η γ ψ= + + + + .  (31) 
  In equations (30) and (31), we have used firms' cost-minimization conditions
(1 )H Ht t Ht nt eto l sη γ ψ− = − − + , and 
F F
t t Ft nt eto l sη γ ψ− = + + , respectively. 
  Log-linearizing the market-clearing conditions of non-energy consumption goods in 
both countries, we obtain 
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in which 
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nt ntc C dj= ∫   is non-energy consumption in the union as a whole. Log-
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in which ( )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ]H FHt Ft et t ta aδ γη γ η δψ γ γ− + − − − − −  is the demand of firms for 
energy goods, relative to that of households in both countries. 
  The relationship between non-energy consumption and the aggregate consumption 
in the union as a whole can be described as 
 W Wnt et tc cαψ= − + .  (35) 
  Similarly, the relationship between consumption of energy goods and non-energy 
consumption in the union is 
 .W Wet et ntc cψ= +   (36) 
From equations (28) to (36), and using the fact that the aggregate non-energy 
consumption is equal to the aggregate non-energy output, so that
(1 )W W H Fnt nt nt ntc y y yγ γ= = + −  , we can express the variables 
, , , , , , , , , ,H F W HHt Ft et t t t et nt nt
F
nt ntc l l c y y c sη η ψ   in terms of non-energy output 
W
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union, the terms of trade nts , and other exogenous variables. 
  After some algebra, we can express home and foreign employment respectively as 
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Intuitively, when the output in the union as a whole rises, the demands for home and 
foreign labor increase at the same time. However, the expenditure-switching 
mechanism of the terms of trade implies that, when the terms of trade in the home 
country deteriorate, the demand for home labor increases, while the demand for foreign 
labor decreases. The substitution between labor and energy means that, when energy 
supply goes up, the labor input goes down in both countries. In addition, a positive 
productivity shock in either country decreases the demand for labor in both countries.3 
  We can also express the home and foreign domestic consumption-goods wages 
respectively as 
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  The rise in output in the union as a whole increases the demands for labor and pushes 
up the wages, but lowers the prices of non-energy consumption goods in both countries. 
As a result, the relative prices of non-energy consumption goods in terms of energy 
goods rise. As previously discussed, the deterioration of the terms of trade implies home 
consumption goods are cheaper than foreign consumption goods. As a result, home 
domestic consumption goods wage rises, while foreign domestic consumption goods 
wage falls. When energy endowment goes up, the households tend to substitute energy 
for non-energy consumption goods, while firms substitute energy for labor input. Both 
wages and the prices of non-energy consumption goods decline in both countries. 
However, the decrease in the prices of non-energy consumption goods lowers the 
demands for non-energy consumption goods and depresses wages further. 
Consequently, the relative prices of non-energy consumption goods in terms of energy 
goods fall in both countries. The effects of positive productivity shocks in both 
countries can be analyzed similarly. 
  The relative price of non-energy consumption goods in terms of energy good depends 
on the aggregate non-energy output, exogenous energy endowment, and productivity 
shocks, given by 
 (1 )W s Fet c nt o t H t H t
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  The increase in the aggregate non-energy output in the union as a whole lowers the 
price of non-energy consumption goods. Thus the relative price of non-energy 
consumption goods in terms of energy goods falls. As a comparison, the increase in the 
energy endowment lowers the price of energy good, thereby pushing up the relative 
price of non-energy consumption goods in terms of energy goods. The effect of positive 
productivity shocks on the relative price of non-energy consumption goods in terms of 
energy goods is more complicated. A positive productivity shock in either country 
increases the aggregate non-energy output in the union as a whole, thereby decreasing 
the price of non-energy consumption goods. However, after a positive productivity 
shock occurs in either country, firms need to input less energy to produce a given 
amount of output. Consequently, the price of energy goods is depressed substantially. 
The latter effect dominates the former. The relative price of non-energy consumption 
goods in terms of energy goods rises. 
  Expressing the marginal cost in either country in terms of domestic price of non-
energy consumption goods, we obtain the real marginal costs, given by 
 (1 ) (1 )H Hnt Ht et nt ts aφ δ η δψ δ γ= − − + − −   (42) 
 (1 )F Fnt Ft et nt ts aφ δ η δψ δγ= − − − − .   (43) 
  In the following, a variable with tilde denotes the deviation of the log of the variable 
from the corresponding value in flexible-price equilibrium. That deviation is referred 
to as the gap. Using the expressions for ,Ht Ftη η , and etψ , we obtain the real marginal 
cost gaps, given by 
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  As usual, the real 
marginal cost gap moves in the same direction as the output gap. As a comparison, a 
positive terms of trade gap causes a positive real marginal cost gap in the home country, 
but a negative real marginal cost gap in the foreign country. 
  Log-linearizing the Euler equations around the steady state, we derive, for the union 
as a whole, a dynamic IS equation , given by 
 1 1
1 ( ),
1
W W
nt t nt t t t t
c
y y i rπ
α+ +
= − − −
− Φ
E E    (46) 
in which lnt ti R=  is the nominal interest rate of the union, and 1
W
t t tr c += ∆E  is the real 
interest rate in the flexible-price equilibrium. 
  The CPI inflation and the non-energy consumption-goods inflation rates in both 
countries are related according to the following expression 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 11H F W W W Wt nt nt c nt nt c nt nty y y yπ γπ γ π α α− −= + − + Φ − + Φ −  .  (47) 
Under the Calvo price setting mechanism, the price of non-energy consumption goods 
in the home country evolves as 
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1
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Following the familiar procedures in the literatures, we derive a New Keynesian 
Phillips curve to describe the motion of the home non-energy consumption-goods 
inflation, 
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The foreign counterpart of equation (48) is 
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  The terms of trade gap is associated with the non-energy consumption-goods 
inflation rate in both countries in accordance with this identity: 
 ( )1 F H H Fnt nt nt nt t ts s a aπ π−= + − − −    ,  (50) 
in which 1
H H H
t t ta a a −= −   and 1
F F F
t t ta a a −= −  . Equations (46)-(50) constitute the 
equilibrium system of our model. To close the model, we need to supplement equations 
(46)-(50) with one equation describing how the nominal interest rate, ti , evolves over 
time, to describe how monetary policy is conducted. We will introduce various 
monetary policy rules in the subsequent section. 
4.  Monetary policy analysis 
When exporters set prices in their own currency (producer-currency pricing or PCP) 
with no cost-push shock, Clarida et al. (2002) show that the "divine coincidence" 
(Blanchard and Gali, 2007) holds. The "divine coincidence" refers to a situation in 
which the optimal monetary policy can stabilize the inflation and the output gap 
simultaneously, as also holds in a standard closed-economy New Keynesian model 
(Gali, 2008). However, when there are multiple nominal rigidities (Erceg et al., 2000) 
or multiple sectors (Huang and Liu, 2005; Gong et al. 2016), the "divine coincidence" 
breaks down. In a two-country currency-union model with staggered price setting, 
Benigno (2004) shows that the efficient allocation is not feasible, even if there is no 
cost-push shock. The conclusion still holds after we introduce energy good in 
consumption and production. 
Proposition 1. In a two-country, currency-union, New Keynesian model with energy 
goods in consumption and production, it is impossible to implement the flexible-price 
equilibrium allocation. 
Proof.  We prove the proposition by contradiction. Suppose there were a monetary 
policy with which the flexible-price equilibrium allocation can be implemented. Then 
 0nnt
W
tsy = =  for all t, so that 0H Fnt ntππ = = for at t. However, from equation (50), we 
know that H F H Fnt nt t ta aπ π= = ∆ −∆ , which contradicts 0
H F
nt ntππ = =  for all t. ∎ 
In Clarida et al. (2002), after productivity shocks occur, the monetary policymaker 
keeps the inflation rate at zero to eliminate distortions caused by price stickiness in 
either country. Meanwhile, the nominal exchange rate fluctuates to adjust the relative 
price of home consumption goods in terms of their foreign counterparts. Consequently, 
the output gap is also closed in either country, and the "divine coincidence" is realized.  
By comparison, in our model, when the monetary policymaker chooses zero inflation 
rate in the union to eliminate price stickiness distortions, it is impossible to close output 
gaps in both countries.  The reason is that the nominal exchange rate is  absent to 
adjust the relative price of home consumption goods in terms of their foreign 
counterparts. Therefore, the "divine coincidence" breaks down. 
4.1. Optimal monetary policy 
Now we analyze optimal monetary policy, particularly focusing on the role played 
by energy goods, included in both consumption and production. The presence of energy 
goods in consumption makes it possible to distinguish the headline inflation rate from 
the core inflation rate. The inclusion of energy goods in the production function changes 
the real marginal costs, which can be monetary policy targets. In the following, we 
follow Woodford (2003) and derive a quadratic welfare-theoretic loss function facing 
the monetary policymaker by taking a second-order approximation to the joint utility 
function of home and foreign households around the efficient steady state. 
  The monetary policymaker wishes to minimize the following welfare-theoretic loss 
function4 
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independent of policy, and 3)(|| ||O a denotes all relevant terms which are of third or 
                                                        
4 The detailed derivation is in the appendix. 
higher order. 
The expected period welfare loss function can be written as 
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 (53) 
  Due to the presence of price stickiness, the inflation rates of non-energy consumption 
goods in both countries together with the output gap in the whole union appear in the 
loss function. These terms are standard in the New Keynesian monetary model. In 
addition, as discussed previously, in a currency union the nominal exchange rate cannot 
fluctuate to adjust the relative price of home consumption goods in terms of their 
foreign counterparts. Thus, the price stickiness also causes a cross-country distortion. 
Hence, as in Benigno (2004), the terms of trade gap is also present in the loss function. 
The remaining terms appearing in the loss function are specific to our model.  
In a closed-economy New Keynesian monetary model with the energy goods 
present in consumption and production, Bodenstein et al. (2008) show that the real 
marginal cost gap reflects costs arising from the inefficient allocation of energy goods 
between households and firms. Thus, the monetary policymaker should stabilize the 
real marginal cost gap. Intuitively, in a closed-economy model, when a positive 
productivity shock occurs, other things being unchanged, firms tend to use less energy 
goods. Meanwhile, when prices are flexible, the prices of non-energy consumption 
goods fall and households purchase more non-energy consumption goods. As a result, 
firms input more energy good to produce more output. However, when prices are sticky, 
the latter channel, leading to more input of energy goods, is closed. Hence, compared 
with the allocation in flexible-price equilibrium, the use of energy goods between 
households and firms is inefficient, and the monetary policymaker should stabilize the 
real marginal cost gap.  
In our model, price stickiness also prevents households in the other country from 
consuming more non-energy consumption goods produced in the country hit by a 
positive productivity shock. Consequently, firms in the other country use inefficiently 
more energy good than otherwise. Therefore, the price stickiness not only results in the 
inefficient allocation of energy goods between households and firms, but also between 
firms in different countries. 
  The monetary policymaker chooses 
W
nty  , nts  ,
H
ntπ  ,
F
ntπ  , 
H
ntφ  , 
F
ntφ   to minimize 
equation (51) subject to constraints (44)-(50). The optimality conditions of this problem, 
together with constraints (44)-(50), constitute a dynamical system to describe the 
optimal monetary policy. The optimal monetary policy is obtained under the 
assumption that the monetary policymaker has the ability to commit to the policy plan. 
  According to the expected period welfare loss function (53), we can compute the 
welfare loss under the optimal monetary policy, which is then used as a benchmark to 
evaluate various monetary policy rules. 
4.2. Simple monetary policy rules 
  When conducting monetary policy, what is the appropriate target for the monetary 
policymaker in a currency union: the core inflation rate or the headline inflation rate? 
In practice, the European Central Bank targets a weighted average of the Harmonized 
Index of Consumer Prices of the countries in the union to implement monetary policy. 
Carefully inspecting the statistics, we find that food and energy, whose prices are nearly 
flexible, are included in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices. Hence, the 
European Central Bank focuses on the headline inflation rate, when implementing 
monetary policy. In an influential paper, Benigno (2004) shows that, when the degree 
of price stickiness is identical in the union, the optimal monetary policy involves 
targeting a weighted average of the inflation rates in the union, with the weights being 
equal to the size of the economy in each country. However, Benigno (2004) does not 
take such goods as food and energy, having flexible prices, into account. Thus, there is 
no distinction between core inflation rate and headline inflation rate. To fill the gap, we 
introduce energy goods into consumption and production to analyze monetary policy 
decisions facing the policymaker in a currency union. An advantage is that there now 
is a distinction between headline and core inflation. 
  In the following, we assess two different Taylor-type monetary policy rules to answer 
the question: what is the appropriate target for the monetary policymaker in a currency 
union, the core inflation rate or the headline inflation rate? One Taylor-type monetary 
policy rule uses the nominal interest rate to target the headline inflation rate, and the 
other to target the core inflation rate. The criterion is welfare loss under the optimal 
monetary policy. The Taylor-type monetary policy rule whose welfare loss is closest to 
the criterion performs better than the other. 
  The first rule, the headline inflation Taylor rule (HIT), is specified as 
 t t y nti yπρ φ π φ= + +  ,  (54) 
where lnρ β= −  is the nominal interest rate in the steady state and tπ  is the headline 
inflation rate. 
The other rule, the core inflation Taylor rule (CIT), is described as 
 ( )( )1H Ft nt nt y nti yπρ φ γπ γ π φ= + + − +  .  (55) 
  For convenience, we consider the Taylor rule in which the nominal interest rate does 
not respond to the output gap. But our conclusions still hold, when the nominal interest 
rate responds to the output gap. 
4.2.1. Calibration 
  We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency. Consistent with the annualized real 
interest rate of 4% in the steady state, we set the subjective discount factor β to be 0.99. 
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) will be represented by σ . There is no 
consensus in the macroeconomics literature on the appropriate value for the IES. Hall 
(1988) estimates the IES to be close to zero, while Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Gruber 
(2006) argue for a value greater than 1. Following most of the literature5, we set σ to 
be unity, with utility function of consumption being logarithmic. Similarly, there is a 
                                                        
5 See, among many others, Gali and Monacelli (2005, 2016), Bodenstein et al. (2008), and Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2014). 
wide discrepancy between the micro and macro literatures on the estimate of the Frisch 
elasticity of labor supply, ϕ⁻¹. We follow Farhi et al. (2014) by setting ϕ to be 2. The 
elasticity of substitution between differentiated varieties of non-energy consumption 
goods, ε, is set to be 6, which implies that the markup is 20% in the steady state. 
Following Bodenstein et al. (2008), we set the expenditure shares of energy goods in 
consumption and production to be 6% and 2%, respectively. Equivalently, α=6% and 
δ=2%. According to Benigno (2004), the expenditure share, γ, of the households in both 
countries on non-energy consumption goods produced in the home country is set to be 
0.5.  The nominal stickiness is assumed to have a duration of four quarters, so that
0.75H Fθ θ= = . 
At time zero, the union economy is in its non-stochastic steady state.  At time 1.0, 
the economic union is hit by unexpected productivity shocks and an energy endowment 
shock, uncorrelated with each other. Following Bodenstein et al. (2008), we set 
0.8H F oρ ρρ= = =  , to capture the persistence of the shocks, and 
0.02H F oσ σ σ= = = , to describe the volatility of the shocks. Following Taylor’s (1993) 
initial calibration, we set 1.5 and 0.125y= =πφ φ . The parameter values used in the 
simulation are listed in Table 1. 
4.2.2. Welfare results 
  Generally speaking, the conduct of monetary policy depends on the driving force of 
the economy. In our model, there are two types of shocks, productivity shocks and the 
energy endowment shock. We first consider the case in which both countries are hit by 
positive productivity shocks and then a negative energy endowment shock. We compare 
the welfare loss function incurred by following the HIT with that incurred by following 
the CIT. The absolute value of the difference between two welfare loss functions 
represents the welfare gain obtained by following the rule whose welfare loss is closest 
to that when the optimal monetary policy is implemented. 
Table 1: Parameter values in the benchmark case 
 Parameter Value 
The subjective discount factor β 0.99 
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ 1 
The Frisch elasticity of labor supply ϕ⁻¹ 1/2 
The elasticity of substitution between non-energy consumption goods ε 6 
The expenditure share of energy good in consumption α 6% 
The expenditure share of energy good in production δ 2% 
Country's economic size γ 0.5 
Nominal contract duration i n the home country θH 0.75 
Nominal contract duration in the foreign country θF 0.75 
 
4.2.3. The source of shocks matters 
  Figure 1 reports the welfare gains for various combinations of price stickiness in both 
countries. When productivity shocks occur in the whole union, the welfare comparison 
results reveal that the HIT policy performs better than CIT. However, as a comparison, 
when a negative energy endowment shock occurs, the CIT policy is a better choice. 
 
 
Figure 1. Welfare gains 
  Observe that the only difference between HIT and CIT is that, when the monetary 
policymaker follows HIT, the nominal interest rate responds not only to the core 
inflation rate but also to the inflation rate of the energy good. When the home country 
is buffeted by a positive productivity shock, the marginal cost of the home non-energy 
consumption-goods firms falls. In spite of the existence of the nominal rigidity, the 
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prices of non-energy consumption-goods adjust downwards gradually. Whether the 
monetary policymaker targets the headline inflation or the core inflation, the nominal 
interest rate falls. As a result, the households in the whole union increase expenditure 
on both energy good and non-energy consumption goods. Both home and foreign non-
energy consumption-goods firms produce more outputs to meet the demands. Thus, 
except for home non-energy consumption-goods firms, which decrease the energy-
good input because of technological advance, all other parties increase the demands for 
the energy good. On the whole, the expansionary demands in the energy-good market 
push the energy-good price up. Therefore, the decrease in core inflation is greater than 
the decrease in headline inflation. Upon impact, the CIT policy results in the level of 
the nominal interest rate being lower than that for the HIT policy. 
 
Figure 2: Impulse responses to a home positive productivity shock 
  The lower nominal interest rate from CIT policy causes more welfare loss than from 
HIT. We explain the mechanism by analyzing the impulse responses, given by Figure 
2. As mentioned above, monetary policy is more expansionary under CIT than under 
HIT. Consequently, under CIT, higher labor demand causes higher wage in the foreign 
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country. In addition, the energy-good price is higher. In the foreign country, marginal 
cost is higher under CIT than under HIT. In the home country, technological advance 
reduces the demands of non-energy consumption-goods firms for labor and energy 
good. Under CIT, the reductions in the demands for the two inputs are smaller than 
under HIT, because of the more expansionary monetary policy. Thus, home wage 
declines, with the degree of reduction being smaller under CIT than under HIT.  
The response of marginal cost follows the same pattern as the wage in the home 
country. The impulse responses of the marginal costs confirm our analysis. In the 
foreign country, the marginal cost gap is positive with the gap being wider under CIT 
than under HIT. By comparison, in the home country, the marginal cost gap is negative 
with the gap being narrower under CIT than under HIT. In a model without price rigidity, 
the more expansionary monetary policy under CIT implies that the foreign non-energy 
consumption-goods price level rises, with the degree of that rise being higher under CIT 
than under HIT. By comparison, the home non-energy consumption-goods price level 
falls, because of the falling marginal cost, with the degree of the decrease being smaller 
under CIT than under HIT.  
However, because of the price rigidity, the adjustment of the non-energy 
consumption-goods price levels are sluggish. Upon impact, the differences in the 
impulse responses of home and foreign non-energy consumption-goods inflation rates 
are very slight under CIT and HIT. The same is also true for the core and headline 
inflation rates. The slight differences in the home and foreign non-energy consumption-
goods inflation rates result in the nearly identical terms of trade gap under CIT and HIT. 
In spite of this, both home and foreign non-energy consumption-goods firms produce 
more outputs. Accordingly, the negative output gap is narrower under CIT than under 
HIT. 
  When the initial lower interest rate returns to the steady state more rapidly, the more 
expansionary monetary policy under CIT turns to be more contractionary than HIT. 
Thus the rising energy-good price begins to fall more rapidly under CIT than under HIT. 
The more contractionary monetary policy implies that the foreign non-energy 
consumption-goods price increases less, but the home non-energy consumption-goods 
price decreases more, under CIT than under HIT. In this case, both core and headline 
inflation rates are more deflationary and the negative output gap is wider under CIT 
than under HIT. From the point of welfare loss, the more contractionary monetary 
policy causes more welfare loss. Thus, following HIT can incur a lower welfare loss 
than CIT, when productivity shocks hit the economy. 
  The situation is different, when the whole union is hit by a negative energy 
endowment shock. Upon impact, the rising energy price and the nominal stickiness in 
the non-energy consumption-goods sector result in a higher nominal interest rate under 
HIT than under CIT. The higher nominal interest rate depresses consumption. The rising 
energy price reduces the firms' energy input in both countries and pushes the marginal 
product of labor down. A declining marginal product of labor decreases labor demand, 
so that households receive less wage payment than before. Upon impact, the decline of 
household demands for non-energy consumption goods under HIT is greater than under 
CIT. As a result, the decrease in the outputs of non-energy consumption goods in both 
countries under HIT is greater than that under CIT. The severe contraction under HIT 
lowers the demands for both energy good and non-energy consumption goods. Upon 
impact, both home and foreign inflation rates of non-energy consumption goods fall 
below zero.  
Meanwhile, the increase in the price of the energy good is depressed so that the 
degree of increase in energy price under HIT is smaller than under CIT. Initially, both 
headline and core inflation rates under HIT are lower than under CIT. The amplification 
effect of the monetary policy following HIT yields a wider negative output gap in the 
whole union. As for the marginal costs, the substantial decline in wage under HIT upon 
impact counteracts the depressed increase in energy price, and produces a negative real 
marginal cost gaps in both countries. The previous analysis implies that, by comparison, 
the slight increase in the nominal interest rate under CIT only causes slight increase in 
all variables, except for the headline inflation rate in Figure 3. 
 Figure 3: Impulse responses to a negative energy endowment shock 
  The initial contraction caused by following HIT deflates core inflation and depresses 
the increase in energy price. Thus, the nominal interest rate under HIT begins to fall to 
a degree greater than under CIT. Consequently, the economy expands, and the above 
analysis is in a reversal. At some point in the expansion, the inflation rates of non-
energy consumption goods under HIT in both countries exceed their counterparts under 
the CIT.  The same is therefore also true of both the headline and core inflation rates. 
The negative output gap in the whole union turns to be positive. Meanwhile, the real 
marginal cost gaps also change progressively from negative to positive. The monetary 
policy following HIT amplifies the responses of economy to a negative energy 
endowment shock, once again. By comparison, by having a mild increase in the 
nominal interest rate, the CIT avoids the severe contraction and expansion caused by 
following HIT, thereby incurring a smaller welfare loss. The welfare loss arising from 
the terms of trade gap is negligible, since the negative energy endowment shock is 
global for both countries. 
  To illustrate our analysis, in Table 2 we list the welfare losses by following HIT and 
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CIT, respectively, for four alternative cases: (1) 0.8,H Fθ θ= =  (2) 0.7,H Fθ θ= =  (3) 
0.6,H Fθ θ= =   and (4) 0.5H Fθ θ= =  . The welfare loss comparisons in Table 2 
confirm our conclusion that, when positive productivity shocks occur, HIT outperforms 
CIT. Thus, compared with CIT, following HIT yields welfare gains. However, when the 
whole union is hit by a negative energy endowment shock, it is CIT, rather than HIT, 
that causes the smaller welfare loss. 
Table 2: Welfare losses comparison 
 
Productivity shocks  Energy endowment shock 
HIT CIT 
Welfare 
Gains 
HIT CIT 
Welfare 
Gains 
( )L 0.8H Fθ θ= =  0.3982 0.4172 0.0190 0.0059 0.00018 0.0058 
( )L 0.7H Fθ θ= =  0.3010 0.3144 0.0134 0.0035 0.00012 0.0034 
( )L 0.6H Fθ θ= =  0.2171 0.2240 0.0070 0.0020 7.19e-05 0.0019 
( )L 0.5H Fθ θ= =  0.1539 0.1572 0.0033 0.0013 4.26e-05 0.0012 
 
5. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we introduce energy goods into an otherwise standard two-country, 
monetary union, New Keynesian model to study what is the best inflation measure to 
target: core inflation or headline inflation. We show that it is impossible to implement 
the flexible-price equilibrium allocation. To evaluate two alternative Taylor-type 
monetary policy rules, the headline inflation Taylor rule and the core inflation Taylor 
rule, we derive the welfare loss function and find that the monetary policymaker should 
target output gap in the whole union, the terms of trade gap, the Prouder Price Index, 
and the real marginal cost gaps. We use the welfare loss function as a benchmark to 
assess two Taylor-type monetary policy rules mentioned above. Welfare loss 
comparisons reveal that shocks play a very important role in determining which Taylor-
type monetary policy rule to be chosen by the monetary policymaker. We find that, 
when positive productivity shocks buffet the economy, following the core inflation 
Taylor rule amplifies the shock and causes a greater welfare loss than following the 
headline inflation Taylor rule. Thus, the headline inflation Taylor rule is a better choice. 
By comparison, when a negative energy endowment shock hits the economy, following 
the headline inflation Taylor rule amplifies the shock and causes a greater welfare loss 
than following the core inflation Taylor rule. Therefore, the monetary policymaker 
should follow the core inflation Taylor rule under those circumstances. 
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Appendix: 
 
    A1. Derivation of the steady state 
    From the consumption-labor choice equation, we can get 
1 ( )
H
H n o
LS Cγ α σ ϕ
γ
−Λ Ψ =  
( )
1
F
F n o
LS Cγ α σ ϕ
γ
Λ Ψ =
−
, 
in which H H
n
W
P
Λ =   and 
n
F F
W
P
Λ =  , while C   is the steady state consumption of the 
representative household. In equilibrium, the consumption of the representative household equals 
the world consumption WC .  So we have 
( )( ) 1
( )
1
H
H
H
F F
F n
L
L
LS L
ϕ ϕ
ϕ
γγ
γ
γ
 −Λ
= =  
Λ  
−
. 
From the pricing equation of intermediate goods firms under flexible prices, we have 
( )1 1 1(1 )H n e HHS A
δγ δ δδ δ− − −Λ Ψ = − Λ  
( ) 1 1(1 )F n e FFS A
δγ δ δδ δ− −Λ Ψ = − Λ . 
    Note that since we consider efficient steady state under flexible prices, the prices of non-energy 
goods equal their marginal costs. Then we have 
.H H
F n FS
δ
 Λ Λ
= Λ Λ 
 
    By rearranging the aggregate production function of the two countries, we get 
( )1 1( ) ( ) ( )1
H H H H H H
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so that 
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    Combining with the market-clearing condition of the non-energy consumption-goods market,  
1 , (1 ) ,H n W F n Wn n n n n nY S C Y S Cγ γ
− −= = −  
we obtain 
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Therefore 
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    From this expression, we have 
1
H
F
L
L
γ
γ
=
−
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Then we can obtain 
1, 1, 
1
H
H H
n F
F n F
OS
S O
γ
γ
Λ Λ
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Λ Λ −
, 
since 
, ,s H F H Fe pO O O C O O O= + + = +  
and 
1 ,
1 1
H H F F
H n e F n eO S L O S L
γ γδ δ
δ δ
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− −
. 
Eliminating HL  and FL , we obtain 
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so that 
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Also, we know that 
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Therefore, we have the following: 
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in which the third equality of the above equation comes from the fact that 
( ) ( ) 11 1(1 ) (1 ) .H e H H e
δ δδ δ δ δ δδ δ δ δ−− − − −Λ Ψ = − Λ ⇒ Λ Ψ = −  
So we can get 
( )
( )
( )
1
,
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O O
δ αα
α δ α α δ α
−
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+ − + −
. 
This is an important expression for log-linearization of the equilibrium system under sticky price 
and for derivation of the welfare loss function. 
We define the total labor in the whole union as H FL L L= +  . From 
,
1 1
H H F F
H e F eO L O L
δ δ
δ δ
= Λ Ψ = Λ Ψ
− −
 and using the fact that H FΛ = Λ , we have 
.
1
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Meanwhile, 1e eC C
αα −= Ψ .  After some algebra, we get 
( ) 11
1p e H e
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δ α δα
α δ
−−= Ψ = Λ Ψ
−
. 
    Combining with H e C L
α α ϕΛ Ψ = , we can derive the following expression 
1
1
( , )
( , )
                    (1 )(1 ),
L
c
U C L L L
U C L C C
+
−− =
= − −
ϕ
σ
δ α
 
which will be used to derive the welfare loss function. 
 
A2 The flexible-price equilibrium 
In the following, we use a lower-case letter, tx , to denote the log deviation of the variable 
under sticky price equilibrium from their efficient steady state value. We define 
ln ln
H H
t
Ht H H
nt n
W W
P P
η = −  and ln ln
F F
t
Ft F F
nt n
W W
P P
η = − . We use tx  to denote the log deviation of 
a variable under flexible price equilibrium from its efficient steady state value. We can write 
t t tx x x= +  , where t t tx x x= − . 
    By log-linearizing the labor-consumption choice conditions, the production functions of non-
energy goods, optimal conditions of non-energy firms, the non-energy goods market-clearing 
conditions, the energy goods market-clearing conditions, the demands of non-energy goods 
consumption, energy goods consumption, and the definitions of non-energy goods real marginal 
costs, we obtain the following equations under flexible prices: 
 (1 ) W HHt nt et t ts c lη γ αψ ϕ− − + = +   (1) 
 W FFt nt et t ts c lη γ αψ ϕ+ + = +   (2) 
 [ (1 ) ]Ht Ht nt et Hta sδ η γ ψ η+ − − + =   (3) 
 [ ]Ft Ft nt et Fta sδ η γ ψ η+ + + =   (4) 
 [ (1 ) ]H H Hnt t t Ht nt ety a l sδ η γ ψ= + + − − +   (5) 
 [ ]F F Fnt t t Ft nt ety a l sδ η γ ψ= + + + +   (6) 
 (1 )H Wnt nt nty s cγ= − +   (7) 
 F Wnt nt nty s cγ= − +   (8) 
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  (9) 
 W Wnt et tc cαψ= − +   (10) 
 W Wet et ntc cψ= + .  (11) 
    The linear system consists of 11 equations and 11 endogenous variables. We can solve for these 
endogenous flexible-price variables in terms of exogenous shocks ,H Ft ta a , and 
s
to . 
Specifically, we present the derivation of several important equations: 
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 H Fnt t ts a a= −   (14) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1W s H Ft t t tc o a aα δ δα γ α γ α≡ + − + − + − −   (15) 
 ( )(1 ) 1s H Fet t t to a aψ δ γ γ= − − − −   (16) 
     (1 )W s H Fnt t t
W
n tt yc o a aδ γ γ= = + + − .  (17) 
    A3 The sticky-price equilibrium 
By log-linearizing the first order conditions, the market-clearing conditions, and some 
definitions, we obtain the following sticky-price systems. Note that the sticky price system is similar 
to its flexible price counterpart, except that under flexible prices the prices of the non-energy 
consumption goods are equal to the mark up of the marginal costs: 
 (1 ) HHt nt et t
W
ts c lη γ αψ σ ϕ− − + = +   (18) 
 FFt nt et t t
W lcsη γ αψ σ ϕ+ + = +   (19) 
 [ (1 ) ]H H Hnt t t Ht nt ety a l sδ η γ ψ= + + − − +   (20) 
 [ ]F F Fnt t t Ht nt ety a l sδ η γ ψ= + + + +   (21) 
 (1 ) Wnt
H
nt nty s cγ= − +   (22) 
 WFnt t ntny s cγ= − +   (23) 
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 (1 ) (1 )H Hnt Ht et nt ts aφ δ η δψ δ γ= − − + − −   (27) 
 (1 )F Fnt Ft et nt ts aφ δ η δψ δγ= − − − − .  (28) 
So we obtain 11 equations for 13 endogenous variables (note that W Wnt ntc y= ). Since this is a 
linear system, we can express all variables in terms of non-energy output, Wnty ,  terms of trade, 
nts , and other exogenous shocks. Especially. We will derive the dynamic IS curve equations and 
New Keynesian Phillips Curve equations, which are central for characterizing the equilibrium 
dynamics. 
After obtaining the expressions for real marginal costs, Hntφ  and 
F
ntφ  , following standard 
procedures, we have that home and foreign New Keynesian Phillips Curves are, respectively 
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    Log-linearizing the Euler equation of the representative household and rearranging, we can 
acquire the dynamic IS curve equation 
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in which 1Et t tr c += ∆ . 
    A4 Derivation of the welfare loss function 
    We take two steps to derive the second-order approximation to the welfare loss function. First, 
we take the second-order Taylor expansion for some key equations. Then we use these results to 
derive the second-order approximation to the joint utility function of the households in the union. 
    We define 
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By log-linearizing, we obtain 
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    We can rewrite the above equation as 
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Since  
,W set tc o ξ= −  
we have 
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    From the aggregate production functions, we know that 
(1 ) , (1 )H H H H H F F F F Fnt t t t t nt t t t ty d a l o y d a l oδ δ δ δ+ = + − + + = + − +  
In addition, we have 
1 1( ), ( ),
1 1
H H H H H F F F F F
t nt t t t t nt t t tl y d o a l y d o a= + − − = + − −− −
δ δ
δ δ
 
so that 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
1(1 ) ( (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) )
1
1  ( (1 ) (1 ) )
1
1 1  (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1 1 1 1
1 (1 )
1
H F H F H F H F
t t t t t t pt t t
W H F H F
nt t t pt t t
FW s H H Fe e
ntnt t nt t ts s
H
t t
l l y y d d o a a
y d d o a a
C Cy o d d
O O
a a
γ γ γ γ γ γ δ γ γ
δ
γ γ δ γ γ
δ
δ δ γφ γ φ δ γ γ
δ δ δ δ
γ γ
δ
+ − = + − + + − − − + −
−
= + + − − − + −
−
= − − + − + − + −
− − − −
− + −
−

( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 22 2
2 2[ ] [ 1 (1 ) ]
2(1 ) 2(1 )
H Fp p p pF
nt nts s s s
O O O O
O O O O
δ δγ γ φ γ γ φ
δ δ
   
+ − + − − −   − −   
 
 (30) 
and 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1
(1 )
1 1
p e
s s
O C
O O
αδ α αδ α
α δ α
α δ α α δ α
− −
= = − =
+ − + −
. 
Thus, we have derived the expressions Wtc  and (1 )
H F
t tl lγ γ+ − , which will be used to eliminate 
the first order terms in the welfare loss function. 
    In the following, we assume that ( ) ( ) ( )
1
lo, g
1
W WW LCU C L u C v L
ϕ
ϕ
+
= −−
+
= . 
Since all the households are identical within each region, the total period utility function of the 
planner is given by 
( )( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
1
H F
W Wt t
t t t
L LX u C v u C v
n
γ γ
γ
   
= − + − −   −   
. 
Utility is maximized when consumption and employment take on their efficient values, 
( )max ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
1
H F
W Wt t
t t t
L LX u C v u C vγ γ
γ γ
      
= − + − −      −      
. 
    The total welfare loss of the currency union is 0
0
1
2
t
t
t
E wβ
∞
=
= ∑W ， in which 
max
t t
t t W
C
X Xlos
U C
w s −= − =  . Taking a second-order approximation around the non-stochastic 
efficient steady state, we have 
 
( ) ( )( )2 21(1 )(1 )[ (1 ) ] (1 )(1 ){ 1 },2
W H F H F
t t t tt t tc lw loss l l l
+
= − − − + − − − − + −= −    
ϕδ α γ γ δ α γ γ  
 (31) 
in which we use the fact that in steady state ,  
1
H FL L L
γ γ
= =
−
,  W WCC Cu C u Cσ= −  
2
LL Lv L v Lϕ= , and ( )( )1 1L W
C
u L
u C
δ α= − − . In addition, note that we use the fact that 
0H Ft tl l= = , when 1σ = . 
    Using the expressions for the gaps of Wtc  and (1 )
H F
t tl lγ γ+ −  and substituting them into 
(31), we obtain the welfare loss function 
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in which 
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1
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δ
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=
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